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Abstract— Role-based access control (RBAC) models have generated a great interest in the 
security community as a powerful and generalized approach to security management and ability to 
model organizational structure and their capability to reduce administrative expenses. In this 
paper, we highlight the drawbacks of latest developed RBAC models in terms of access control and 
authorization and later provide a more viable extended-RBAC model, which enhances and extends 
its powers to make any system more secure by adding valuable constraints. Later the Blobs are 
stored on cloud server which is then accessed by the end users via this Extended RBAC model.  
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 I INTRODUCTION  
Authorization and access control has always been a fundamental security technique in systems in which 
multiple users share access to common resources. Authorization is the process of expressing security 
policies that determine whether a subject (e.g., process, computer, human user, etc.) is allowed to 
perform an operation (e.g., read, write, execute, delete, search, etc.) on an object (e.g., a tuple in a 
database, a table, a file, a service, and, more generally, any resource of the system). These policies define 
the subject's permissions (rights to carry out an operation on an object) in a computer system. Access 
control is the process of enforcing these policies in order to achieve the desired level of security. 
Managing and administering the users' privileges is one of the most challenging tasks in access control. 
Several access control models have been proposed, such as, discretionary and mandatory access control 
models (DAC and MAC), Clark-Wilson model, Lipner's Integrity model, Chinese wall model, Task 
based models, and Role Based Access Control models and RBAC has further been extended up to some 
level. Among these models Role-based access control (RBAC) models have been receiving attention as 
they provide systematic access control security through a proven and increasingly predominant 
technology for commercial organizations. One of the main advantages of the RBAC over other access 
control models is the ease of its security administrations. RBAC models are policy neutral [5]; they can 
support different authorization policies including mandatory and discretionary through the appropriate 
role configuration. In spite of the success of the RBAC, researchers have determined that there are still 
many application security requirements that are not addressed by the existing RBAC models [6]. In the 
past few years, several RBAC extensions have been proposed to address such security requirements [2, 
3, 4, 6, 8, 13, and 14]. Although, these extensions geared and enhanced basic RBAC model, however we 
find some applications where individually these extended models fall short. We will uncover the loop-
hole in existing extended RBAC model and later will add a mechanism to resolve such an issue. 
II BASICS ABOUT ROLE BASED ACCESS CONTROL  
Sandhu et al [1] proposed RBAC 96 which is a family of four constitutes models. In RBAC permissions 
are associated with roles (the intermediate concept of roles can be seen as collections of permissions), 
and users are made members of appropriate roles. The notion of role is an enterprise or organizational 
concept. The definition of role is quoted from Sandhu et al. [1]: A role is a job function or job title within 
the organization with some associated semantics regarding the authority and responsibility conferred on 
a member of the role. Permissions are not directly assigned to users; instead they are assigned to roles. 
RBAC comprise a family of four references models: 
 
RBAC0: contains the core concepts of the Model. It is the minimum requirement for any system that 
exploits features of RBAC. Users (U), roles (R), and permissions (P) are three sets of entities and the 
relations between these entities are defined by User-Role Assignment and Permission-Role Assignment 
[1]. These sets and relations are the main concepts of the RBAC. A user can be member of many roles 
and each role can have many users. A user can invoke multiple sessions within a session a user can 
invoke set of roles but each session belongs to only one user. Permission can be assigned to many roles 
and a role can have many permissions. 
 
RBAC1: adds to RBAC0 a role hierarchy (RH). Role hierarchies are an important concept for structuring 
roles to represent organization users responsibly and degree of authority. 
 
RBAC2: introduces the concept of constraints. RBAC adds static (not related to sessions) and dynamic 
(related to sessions) constraints between core concepts [1] . These constraints are considered to be the 
principle motivation for RBAC because constraints are powerful mechanism to lay out higher-level 
organizational mechanism [1].Constraints can be applied to User-Role Assignment, Permission-Role 
Assignment and session. 
 
RBAC3: includes all aspects of RBAC0, RBAC1 and RBAC2 and it is called a unified model of RBAC. 
RBAC3 combine RBAC1 and RBAC2 to combine both role hierarchy and constraints. In this model 
constraints can be applied to the role hierarchy in addition to the constraints in RBAC2. 
 
E-RBAC: E-RBAC model was presented for RBAC 96 model and it filled the role authorization 
shortage in RBAC96. In E-RBAC users can also direct for authorization. For example, when the 
authority is authorized after a specific request to access the user's system resources, the system at the 
same time can judge whether the users own role or whether the user has authority access to the module's 
functions, as long as one is given the authority between the users and their role, to allow access. 
 
           
 III BLOB STORAGE ON CLOUD SERVER 
Blob storage is a service for storing large amounts of unstructured data that can be accessed from 
anywhere in the world via HTTP or HTTPS. A single blob can be hundreds of gigabytes in size, and a 
single storage account can contain up to 100TB of blobs. Common uses of Blob storage include: 
• Serving images or documents directly to a browser 
• Storing files for distributed access 
• Streaming video and audio 
• Performing secure backup and disaster recovery 
The Blob service contains the following components: 
Storage Account: All access to Cloud Storage is done through a storage account. This is the highest 
level of the namespace for accessing blobs. An account can contain an unlimited number of containers, 
as long as their total size is under 100TB. 
Container: A container provides a grouping of a set of blobs. All blobs must be in a container. An 
account can contain an unlimited number of containers. A container can store an unlimited number of 
blobs. 
Blob: A file of any type and size. There are two types of blobs that can be stored in Cloud Storage: block 
and page blobs. Most files are block blobs. A single block blob can be up to 200GB in size. Page blobs, 
another blob type, can be up to 1TB in size, and are more efficient when ranges of bytes in a file are 
modified frequently.  
 
 
 
 IV PROBLEM FORMULATION 
 
Although current RBAC models restrict a user to access the resources if it is not assigned as a member to 
any particular role of the architecture, however the RBAC nowhere defines that how many users could 
be assigned to each role. This limitation largely affects the architecture not only in terms of its security 
but also when one accesses the resources on a shared server where it affects the network bandwidth also. 
RBAC also allows users to access resources based on the roles. All users are made members of roles and 
permissions are also associated with roles. Later when any user wants to access any resource, its access 
depends on the constraints imposed on that particular role and it is imposed on all other users of that role 
also. This limitation makes architecture quite ordinary as there is no such mechanism to provide different 
level of accesses to different users under one particular role. Also RBAC does not impose any 
transaction limit for users to access available resources under specified roles. This limitation leads to 
insecurity of the system where resources can be accessed at free will even if login of any existing user is 
hacked or uncovered. Keeping all these flaws of RBAC into consideration, there is need of an 
architectural system which will address all these issues and hence will result as a more powerful RBAC 
model. 
 
 V  PROPOSED ERBAC MODEL 
 
This Extended RBAC Model is proposed to address aforesaid problems so as to enhance its robustness. 
Firstly in this model during the creation of any new role, the constraint is imposed on role to decide how 
many users can access this role later. Here an organization can make use of this feature to provide 
membership of role to only such users which are beneficial for the organization. Secondly another 
constraint is imposed on all the normal users who can access resources later so that they can access the 
organizational resources on a limited basis for some specific time intervals. Although it looks that it will 
result in inconvenience to users as they can make limited transactions and thus cannot access the 
resources at free will. However it is one of the strong dimensions where we can make RBAC more 
powerful. This is because imposing transactions limits will reduce the chances of minimizing loss of 
resources of any particular user if cannot be saved and eliminated in totality. However here organization 
can assign the limit based on the usual usage of users. Next whenever any user is made member of any 
particular role, then at that time we are providing an option there to rate this user based on his 
membership status. This feature will largely help an organization to give different accesses to users 
irrespective of belonging to the same role. This decision is to be taken on the basis of premium 
membership to be attained by the user. Here by using this feature all normal users can access resources 
only to that extent to which that particular role will allow them. However the premium users will get 
access more than to role limit and will be decided on the basis of their premium membership. Finally in 
this proposed system we are planning to use the Blob service of resources so as use it service as on 
Cloud. Later we will impose all the added features on these blobs so as to check its integrity and 
robustness to evolve as an enhanced model. All these features are summed up in the following flow 
based diagram: 
 
 
     VI    CONCLUSION: 
 
This proposed model has outlined a sketch for new RBAC which addresses the security features for any 
multi-centric application. We have investigated the state-of-art of the access control models. In 
particular, we have investigated the current RBAC extensions as they are most influential authorization 
models in the security community. This proposed model, however, showed that, all or most of the 
existing RBAC extensions are not suitable for specifying security requirements of that application. 
Although this study might not be exhaustive, however we believe that this model will provide another 
picture of the RBAC will result into much enhanced and more powerful model than other existing 
models. The investigations in this study open the doors to the software stake holders to identify and 
realize the added features which can make their organizational architecture more robust than existing 
RBAC models. 
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